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ABSTRACT 
Moore’s Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, 
Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the 
epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of 
the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikka’s interpretation of one of the doxastic 
operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. 
I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about 
the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for 
problematic cases such as Moore’s Paradox. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Among the problems that any logical analysis of the notion of belief has to address, 
Moore’s Paradox occupies a preeminent position. G. E. Moore observed that sentences 
such as ‘It’s raining but I don’t believe it’ cannot be used to make coherent assertions, even 
though they are not actual contradictions (1942, pp. 541-543; 1944, p. 204). There are 
situations in which the sentence will be true but none in which anybody could use it in a 
literal sense. In general, sentences of the form: 
 
(1) ‘p but I do not believe that p’  
 
are not self-contradictory, but there are no circumstances in which one can use them to 
perform coherent assertoric speech acts. The divergence between the truth conditions and 
the performance conditions of (1) leads to the paradoxical result that there are true 
sentences that one cannot utter.1 
 
1 Moore’s Paradox can be extended to other propositional attitudes (Searle 1969). For example, the 
statement ‘Rain is likely, but I do not expect it’ is also absurd. In this essay I will only be concerned 
with the notion of belief. 
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 That a sentence of this type is not self-contradictory is illustrated by the fact that a 
simple change of person turns (1) into the perfectly natural sentence  
 
(2) ‘p but he does not believe that p’.  
 
Similarly, a change of tense also results in a coherent assertion:  
 
(3) ‘p but I did not believe it’.  
 
Finally, the absurdity of (1) also vanishes when the sentence is embedded in a larger 
context:  
 
(4) ‘Suppose that p but I do not believe that p’. 
  
 These characteristics of (1), which are not mirrored in the case of typical 
contradictions, seem to indicate that the problem is not a function of the truth conditions of 
the sentence, but rather of the performance conditions of the speech act that expresses it 
and, perhaps, of the mental analogue of these performance conditions for the corresponding 
propositional attitudes. For this reason, it has been argued that an adequate analysis of the 
notion of belief must be made in terms of statements, as opposed to sentences. Although an 
analysis in terms of sentences is all that is needed in most cases, there are certain properties 
of statements, such as the identity of the speaker and the recipient of his words, that cannot 
be defined solely in terms of the forms of words. On the other hand, an analysis in terms of 
sentences recommends itself due to the possibility of developing simplified logical systems 
which avoid the unmanageable task of defining complex performance conditions. 
 In Knowledge and Belief (1962), Hintikka tried to achieve the synthesis of both 
approaches. In that seminal work, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements 
that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. Most of 
his analysis is made in terms of sentences, including his explanation of Moore’s Paradox, 
but he describes the way in which the system can be expanded to handle sentences whose 
meaning varies according to the context of utterance and the identity of the speaker.  
 A conspicuous feature of Hintikka’s analysis is that the logic of belief turns out to 
be parasitic on the logic of knowledge in the sense that the former is simply a weaker 
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version of the latter. Although one would expect to find more than one similarity between 
both logics, the fact that the logic of belief is so closely modeled after the system developed 
for the notion of knowledge leads Hintikka to adopt a set of axioms that—I will argue—is 
unnecessarily strong and highly problematic. In this essay I will develop an alternative 
logical system for sentences containing the notion of belief. The system, which I will call 
H*, retains the basic elements of Hintikka’s system but it is based on a weaker set of 
axioms. I will try to show that the axioms of H* capture in a more accurate way our logical 
intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an 
explanation for problematic cases such as Moore’s Paradox. 
 
2. The System H* 
Hintikka’s analysis of the notion of belief is based on the two multimodal operators Ba and 
Ca, which are the formal counterparts of ‘a believes that’ and ‘it is compatible with 
everything that a believes that’. Each subscript a, b, c, ... represents a different individual. 
Hintikka explains the intuitive idea behind the operator Ca in terms of consistency. If my 
beliefs are consistent, it must be possible for all of them to turn out to be true without 
having to give up any of them. Similarly, if something is compatible with my consistent 
beliefs, then it must be possible for this something to turn out to be the case together with 
everything I believe without making it necessary for me to give up any of my beliefs (1962, 
p. 24). In formal terms, if the set {Baq1, Baq2, ..., Baqk, Cap} is consistent, then the set {Baq1, 
Baq2, ..., Baqk, q1, q2, ..., qk, p} must also be consistent. 
 This interpretation, however, is problematic. Clearly my beliefs are consistent if 
there is a possible state of affairs in which they are all true, but it is not obvious why it 
should be added that in that state of affairs I must possess those beliefs. If my beliefs are 
consistent, it is compatible with everything I believe that there is a state of affairs in which 
my beliefs are true even though I may not possess some of them. But Hintikka’s 
interpretation of Ca excludes that possibility because the set {Bap, Ca~Bap} turns out to be 
inconsistent.2 On the other hand, if my beliefs are consistent, it is also compatible with 
 
2 The reason is obvious. Suppose the set {Bap, Ca~Bap}is consistent. Then, according to Hintikka’s 
interpretation of Ca, the set {p, Bap, ~Bap} is consistent, which is absurd. 
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everything I believe that there is a state of affairs in which my beliefs are true and I possess 
those beliefs. This is the only possibility that Hintikka allows. 
 Since there is no obvious reason to exclude the first possibility, my interpretation of 
Ca will be as follows: If the set {Baq1, Baq2, ..., Baqk, Cap} is consistent, then the set {q1, q2, 
..., qk, p} must also be consistent. Thus, according to this interpretation, the set {Bap, 
Ca~Bap} will not be inconsistent. One of the challenges in developing the system H* will 
be to formulate a set of axioms that capture these intuitions about the notion of belief. 
 The basis of H* is as follows. 
 
Primitive Symbols 
 p1, p2, p3, ..., pk     [Propositional variables] 
 ~, Ba, Bb, ..., Bn, Ca Cb, ..., Cn   [Monadic operators] 
&, Ú, É, º     [Dyadic operators]  
 
Formation Rules 
 
FR1  A variable standing alone is a wff. 
FR2 If p is a wff, so is ~p. 
FR3 If p and q are wffs, and • is a dyadic operator, then (p • q) is a wff. 
FR4 If p is a wff, then Bap and Cap are wffs. 
 
Definitions: 
[Def B] Bap ºDef ~Ca~p 
[Def C] Cap ºDef ~Ba~p 
 
Axioms 
The theorems include all tautologies of the propositional calculus, plus the following 
axioms: 
A1 Ba(p É q) É (Bap É Baq) 
A2 Bap É Cap 
A3  Bap É CaBap 
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Transformation Rule 
Modus Ponens (MP)   
   p    p É q  
      q  
 
 Using possible world semantics, we can provide an intuitively meaningful 
interpretation of the system. A model set is a partial description of a possible world. A set 
µ of sentences is a model set iff it satisfies the following conditions: 
 
(C.~) If p Î µ , then ~p Ï µ. 
(C.&)   If p & q Î µ, then p Î µ and q Î µ. 
(C. Ú)   If p Ú q Î µ, then p Î µ or q Î µ (or both). 
(C.~ ~)  If ~~p Î µ , then p Î µ. 
(C.~&)  If ~(p & q) Î µ, then ~p Î µ or ~q Î µ (or both). 
(C. ~Ú)  If ~(p Ú q) Î µ, then ~p Î µ and ~q Î µ. 
 In order to provide a semantical interpretation of the multimodal operators Ba and 
Ca, we need to make reference to more that one model set. The reason is obvious. If p is 
compatible with my beliefs, then there must be at least one state of affairs in which p turns 
out to be the case. But this state of affairs need not be identical with the one in which I 
believe that p. We will call a description of such state of affairs an alternative to µ with 
respect to a.  
 Let W be a set of model sets µ, µ*, µ**, ... Such set of model sets will be called 
a model system. The following conditions must be imposed on a model set µ.  
 
(C.B) If Bap Î µ and if µ belongs to a model system W, then there is in W at least one 
alternative µ* to µ such that p Î µ*. 
(C.B*)  If Bap Î µ and if µ* is an alternative to µ in some model system W, then p 
Î µ*. 
(C.C) If Cap Î µ and if µ belongs to a model system W, then there is in W at least one 
alternative µ* to µ such that p Î µ*. 
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(C. CB) If Bap Î µ and if µ belongs to a model system W, then there is in W at least one 
alternative µ* to µ such that Bap Î µ*. 
(C.BDef)  Bap Î µ if and only if ~Ca~p Î µ 
(C.CDef)  Cap Î µ if and only if ~Ba~p Î µ. 
 
 There are several important differences between the system H* and the system 
proposed by Hintikka. Instead of axiom A3, Hintikka includes the following axiom in his 
system: 
 
(5)  Bap É BaBap. 
 
In defense of (5), he argues (p. 25) that the axiom is necessary to prove that the following 
sentence is a contradiction: 
 
(6) Bap & (Bap É Ba~Bap). 
 
Although (6) is certainly contradictory, it is also true that our system, whose set of axioms 
is weaker than the set of axioms in Hintikka’s system, suffices to show that it is. Consider 
the following reductio of (6) in our system: 
 
(6) Bap & (Bap É Ba~Bap) Î  µ   Counterassumption 
(7) Bap É Ba~Bap  Î  µ   From (6) by (C.&) 
(8) Bap  Î  µ    From (6) by (C.&) 
(9) Ba~Bap  Î  µ    From (7) and (8) by Modus Ponens 
(10) Bap  Î  µ*    From (8) by (C.CB) 
(11) ~Bap  Î  µ*    From (9) by (C.B*) 
 
(10) and (11) violate (C.~), thus reducing the counterassumption ad absurdum. The proof in 
H* shows that Hintikka’s argument alone does not justify the inclusion of axiom (5) in a 
logic of belief. In the next section I will argue that there are independent reasons to reject 
(5) and to adopt the weaker set of axioms.  
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 The conditions that Hintikka imposes on model sets also differ from the ones in our 
system. Instead of our condition (C.CB), Hintikka includes the following condition in his 
system:  
 
 (C.BB*) If Bap Î µ and if µ* is an alternative to µ in some model system W, then Bap 
Î µ*. 
 
Notice the difference between (C.BB*) and (C.CB). The former says that if I believe 
something in µ, I believe it in every alternative to µ. The latter says that if I believe 
something in µ, there is at least one alternative to µ in which I believe it. (C.BB*) entails 
(C.CB), but not the converse. Intuitively, if I believe that p in µ, (C.CB) does not rule out 
the possibility of there being alternatives to µ in which I do not believe that p. This is not a 
problem, for all that is needed for my beliefs to be consistent is that there be at least one 
alternative model set in which they are true. If I believe that p, (C.B) alone guarantees that 
there is at least one alternative model set in which p is true. (C.CB) is added to reflect our 
intuition that there are some model sets in which p is true and I believe it, and others in 
which p is true and I do not believe it. 
 The difference between (C.CB) and (C.BB*), of course, simply reflects our choice 
of axiom A3 instead of Hintikka’s axiom (5). In our system, the sentence 
 
(12) Bap É Ca~Bap 
 
is not a contradiction. If Bap Î µ, there may be an alternative µ* to µ such that ~Bap Î µ*. 
Hence, Bap É BaBap —Hintikka’s axiom (5)—will be false in some model sets. On the 
other hand, according to our condition (C.CB), if Bap Î µ, then there is at least one 
alternative µ* to µ such that Bap Î µ*. Therefore, our third axiom, Bap É CaBap, is true in 
every model set of our system. In the remaining sections of the essay I will provide further 
reasons to support the claim that Hintikka’s axiom (5) should not be a theorem in a logic of 
belief and that it should be replaced by axiom A3. 
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3. Believing That One Believes 
Prima facie, Hintikka’s axiom (5) seems extremely plausible. If I believe that p, it seems 
absurd to deny that I believe that I believe that p. But the obviousness of (5) disappears 
when the sentence is not in the first-person. It is not absurd to assert of someone else that he 
believes that p but he does not believe that he believes that p. Consider the truth conditions 
for the sentence Bap. The sentence is true iff a is in an intentional state whose content is p 
and whose propositional attitude is belief. ~Bap, on the other hand, is true iff a is not in that 
intentional state. Now consider the truth conditions for the sentence BaBap. The sentence is 
true iff a is in an intentional state whose content is Bap and whose mental attitude is belief. 
In other words, BaBap is true iff a’s belief that p is accompanied by a concurrent belief 
whose content is Bap. The negation of BaBap, on the other hand, is true iff a is not in the 
intentional state of believing that Bap. 
 It is perfectly possible that when someone believes that p, no concurrent belief 
occurs about that person’s belief that p. For example, the sentence 
 
(13) ‘Mary believes that it is raining but she does not believe that she believes that it is 
raining’ 
 
is not absurd or self-contradictory. A virtue of our system is that it captures this important 
fact about the notion of belief. The sentence 
 
(13*) Bap & ~BaBap 
 
is not a contradiction in H*. But notice that (13*) is simply the negation of Hintikka’s 
axiom (5). If we accept (5) as an axiom, we would also have to claim that (13) and (13*) 
are contradictions (which is clearly not the case). Therefore, unless we want to misrepresent 
an important aspect of the analysis of the notion of belief, (5) cannot be an axiom of the 
system.  
 What, then, about the absurdity of uttering sentence (13*) when a is the speaker? 
One option is to modify our system and include an ad hoc clause about the performance 
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conditions of sentences in the first person.3 But there is no need to do so. Notice that (13*) 
is just a version of Moore’s Paradox and can be treated as such. In order to examine the 
oddity of (13*), we must now turn to the analysis of Moore’s Paradox. 
 
4. Explaining the Paradox 
Before considering the problem described above, I will return to the original paradox in 
order to show that Hintikka’s proposed solution is also valid in our weaker system. We can 
symbolize Moore’s Paradox in the following terms: 
 
(1*) p & ~Bap. 
 
The sentence is not a contradiction because 
 
(14)  p  É Bap 
 
is not a theorem in either system. Hintikka’s ingenious solution to the paradox is to argue 
that although (1*) is not a contradiction, the following sentence is: 
 
(15) Ba(p & ~Bap). 
 
This sentence corresponds to the general presumption that the speaker believes or at least 
can conceivably believe what he or she says. In Hintikka’s words, “the gist of Moore’s 
Paradox may be said (somewhat elliptically) to lie in the fact that [(15)] is necessarily 
unbelievable by the speaker” (p. 67). A virtue of this approach is that nothing turns on the 
peculiarities of the first-person singular pronoun. (15) is contradictory no matter who a is. 
 Instead of presenting Hintikka’s proof that (15) is a contradiction, I will present a 
similar proof in H*, and indicate the pertinent differences. The proof is a reductio of the 
following counterassumption: 
 
(16) Ba(p & ~Bap) Î µ  Counterassumption 
(17) p & ~Bap Î µ*  From (16) by (C.B*)  
 
3 Axiom (5) makes Hintikka’s system a KD4 system of epistemic logic. Rieger (2015) shows that 
adding the negation of a sentence that states Moore’s Paradox to a KD system would be sufficient 
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(18) Ba( p & ~Bap) Î µ*  From (16) by (C.CB) 
(19) ~Bap Î µ*   From (17) by (C.&) 
(20) Ca~p Î µ*   From (19) by (C. BDef) 
(21) ~p Î µ**   From (20) by (C.C) 
(22) p & ~Bap Î µ**  From (18) by (C.B*) 
(23) p Î µ**   From (22) by (C.&) 
 
Here (21) and (23) contradict (C.~), thus completing the reductive argument. The main 
difference between our argument and Hintikka’s is the justification of (18). Instead of 
(C.CB), which is not a condition in Hintikka’s system, he uses (C.BB*). This difference is 
unimportant because, as Hintikka admits at one point, the proof could be done without 
making use of that condition. 
 We can now return to the version of Moore’s Paradox presented in the previous 
section. Following Hintikka’s strategy, we can prove that although (13*) is not a 
contradiction in H*, the following sentence is: 
 
(24) Ba(Bap & ~BaBap). 
 
The proof is a reductio of the following counterassumption: 
 
(25) Ba(Bap & ~BaBap) Î µ Counterassumption 
(26) Bap & ~BaBap Î µ*  From (25) by (C.B*)  
(27) Ba(Bap & ~BaBap) Î µ* From (25) by (C.CB)  
(28) ~BaBap Î µ*   From (26) by (C.&) 
(29) Ca~Bap Î µ*   From (28) by (C.BDef) 
(30) ~Bap Î µ**   From (29) by (C. C) 
(31) Bap & ~BaBap Î µ**  From (27) by (C.B*) 
(32) Bap Î µ**   From (31) by (C.&) 
 
 
to block it, but that move seems equally ad hoc. The present proposal is based on a revision of the 
modal operator Ca itself, which leads directly to a rejection of Axiom (5). 
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(30) and (32) contradict (C.~), thus completing the reductive argument. Just as in the 
original version of the paradox, (24) is a contradiction regardless of the identity of a.  
 This analysis of (13*) explains the problematic case in which the sentence is in the 
first-person and gives further plausibility to my choice of axiom A3. In fairness to Hintikka, 
I must admit that the advantages of my system over the one he developed in Knowledge 
and Belief depend entirely on my reinterpretation of the modal operator Ca. I believe, 
however, that this reinterpretation, and the system that can be constructed on it, give us a 
better picture of the logical structure of sentences containing the notion of belief. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Epistemic logic has come a long way since the publication of Hintikka’s seminal work, and 
there are other ways of dissolving and explaining the paradox in the literature4. My purpose 
in this paper, however, was merely historical. I wanted to show how it is possible to modify 
Hintikka’s original axioms and definitions to provide a system that is better attuned to our 
philosophical intuitions. In particular, I presented a better interpretation of the modal 
operator Ca, which leads directly to a rejection of the idea that when someone believes that 
p, there must be a concurrent belief about that person’s belief that p. More formally, Bap & 
~BaBap is not a contradiction in H*. This formula is the negation of axiom (5) in Hintikka’s 
original system. The formula is also a version of Moore’s Paradox when a is the speaker. 
As I show in the last section, it can be established in H* that Ba(Bap & ~BaBap) is a 
contradiction, so Hintikka’s original explanation of the paradox remains valid in the new 
system. It remains to be seen how the system H* relates to Hintikka’s analysis of 
knowledge, but that is left for future work. 
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